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Abstract 
This brief paper constructs a model of delegated portfolio management in which two agency 
relationships are characterized. First, a delegation process from investors to fund companies, 
and second, a delegation from fund companies to fund managers. Career concerns of both 
agents lead to a churning equilibrium in which uninformed managers trade noisily, and 
uninformed fund companies are willing to hire these uninformed managers. This equilibrium 
delivers non-fully informative prices and a positive and high trading volume. Our model then 
strengths previous explanations to the trade puzzle, predicting an increasing trade activity as 
long as institutional investors with intense delegation play an increasing role in financial 
markets. 
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1 Introduction
One of the most remarkable puzzle in nancial economics is the so-called trade puz-
zle. This puzzle concerns the inability of standard nance paradigm to account for
(high) trade observed in nancial markets under an environment with asymmetric in-
formation. Given the increasing presence of institutional ownership in nancial markets
during the last fty years, new explanations to this phenomenon have strongly hinged
on the features of this class of investors.1
In particular, recent literature on nancial economics has recognized the prominent
role played by contracts signed by investors and fund companies. Among these works,
that of Dasgupta and Prat (2006, [1]) provides an especially interesting framework that
explains the puzzle trade based mainly upon two elements. First, they consider the
agency problems that emerge when the investor delegates his portfolio management
to the fund company. In addition, due to the no observation of the fund managers
ability, they study contracts with implicit incentives given by reputational or career
concerns. This setting predicts that the presence of career concerns induces uniformed
fund managers to churn, i.e. to trade even when they face a negative expected return.2
Noise trade given by churning makes prices to be non-fully informative, which yields
a positive trading volume in the asset market.
Dasgupta and Prat treat fund companies and fund managers as the same entity,
abstracting then from any agency problem between them. However, as Chevalier and
Ellison (1999, [2]) document, the lack of aligned incentives resulting from this delega-
tion process may become very important to the portfolio strategies followed by fund
managers. Accordingly, in this paper we extend the set-up of Dasgupta and Prat and
study the e¤ects that the additional delegation from fund companies to fund man-
agers can generate on the nancial markets equilibrium. Our main result points out
that when the reputational costs of both fund companies and fund managers are also
considered, the career concern-based explanation for the trade puzzle becomes strong.
As a consequence, this paper accounts not only for the increasing trading activity ob-
served in the nancial markets during the last decades, but also for the relation of
this phenomenon to the increasing participation of institutional investors with more
portfolio management delegation inside them (Dow and Gorton 1997, [3]; Cuoko and
Kanel 2001, [4]; Chevalier and Ellison 1997, [5], and 1999, [2]).
1For instance, in the New York Stock Exchange, the percentage of outstanding corporate equity
held by institutional investors has increased from 7,2% in 1950 to 49,8% in 2002 (NYSE Factbook
2003).
2Churning can be dened as to make the account of a client excessively active by frequent purchases
and sales primarily in order to generate commissions.
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This structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a model with two-
sided career concerns contracts between fund companies and fund managers. The next
section characterizes the churning equilibrium, and discusses its implications for the
trade puzzle. Finally, Section 4 concludes. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a two-period economy. The market trades an Arrow security, which has liqui-
dation value v = 0 or 1 with the same probability of occurrence. This value is revealed
at time t and independent across periods. There are a large pool of ex-ante identical
fund companies and fund managers3. All of them are risk-neutral.
In the rst period, one of the fund companies is employed at random by the investor,
a single risk-neutral principal. Likewise, this fund company may hire one fund managers
and, if so, at the end of the rst period she may decide to retain him, hire a challenger
of average quality from the pool, or not to hire. Her decision is based on the net return
obtained by the fund manager. In the same way, in period 2, the investor decides to
renew the incumbent fund company or hire a new one as she can attempt to infer the
ability of the fund company from the outcome of trading.
Therefore, in this environment, we observe two kind of principal-agent contracts:
the rst one between the investor and the fund company, and the second one between
the fund company and the fund manager. In addition, both agency relationships are
characterized by reputational or career concerns. This is because present actions taken
by both fund companies and fund managers a¤ect their chances of being retained, and
thereby, their future compensations.
The fund company can be of two types: talented or untalented. This is represented
by  2 fu; tg ; with Pr( = t) = . Similarly, the fund manager can be of two types:
good or bad, represented by  2 fb; gg so that Pr( = g) = . Ex ante, all types are
unknown to fund companies, fund managers and the investor, and are independent of
v.
Fund managers interact with a large number of risk-neutral short-lived competitive
uninformed market makers (hereafter traders). Half of them operate in t = 1, the
other half operate in t = 2. Fund managers can issue market orders (at) to buy one
unit of the asset (at = 1), to sell one unit (at = 0) or not to trade (at = ;). The traders
sets ask (pat ) and bid (p
b
t) prices equal to the expected value of v conditional on the
observed order history. The bid-ask spread pat   pbt may be positive, with pat 2

1
2 ; 1

3Throughout the paper, we refer to the principal as she and the agent as he. Notice that the fund
company is the agent in the relationship with the investor and the principal in the labor contract with
the manager.
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and pbt 2

0; 12

. Since fund managers are free to choose one of the market markers at
random, they are then subject to Bertrand competition. Moreover, for simplicity we
assume that traders do not know whether they are in period 1 or 2.4
Before contracting, fund companies observe a signal  on managers type. Talented
companies observe an informative signal that reveals the true type of the manager. In
contrast, untalented companies have access to a noisy signal that does not improve
their beliefs on the managers type. Formally, we have that
(; ) =
(
 if  = t
; if  = u
Based upon this information, fund companies make a decision et 2 f0; 1g, where et = 1
(et = 0) corresponds to hiring (not to hiring) the manager. Whereas untalented fund
companies choose good (bad) fund managers with probability  (with probability 1 ),
talented fund companies only choose good fund managers.
The information structure of the fund manager is as follows. At time t a fund
manager receives a signal s which can take three values, 0, 1, or ;. This signal reveals
privately him his true type as it is determined as follows
s(v; ) =
(
v if  = g
; if  = b
In order to make a di¤erence between trading and not trading, there exists a cost of
trading  > 0 paid by the fund manager.
The net return on investment obtained by the fund manager at time t is denoted
by t; and is dened by
t(a; p
a
t ; p
b
t ; v; ) =
8>><>>:
v   pat    if a = 1
pbt   v    if a = 0
0 if a = ;
Untalented fund companies form a posterior belief about the fund managers type
based upon net returns yield by the portfolio, which is observed at the end of period 1.
Similarly, the investor updates her belief about the fund companys type based on the
same information. All of this is formalized by the posterior probabilities Pr( = gjt)
and Pr( = tjt).
All contractual arrangements between the investor, fund companies and fund man-
agers are exogenously set out. Furthermore, we model payo¤s to fund companies and
fund managers using a simple linear compensation structure. Accordingly, given the net
4This means that they are unable to condition thier action of their seniority (see Dasgupta and
Prat 2006, [1], p. 11).
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return t, fees charged by the fund company to the investor correspond to wt = t+:
Similarly, the payment from the fund company to the manager is given by t = t+.
We assume that  and  2 (0; 1); and  and  2 (0;1).5
Hence, the total investors payo¤ is given by6
2X
t=1
(t   wt)
and the total fund companys payo¤ is
2X
t=1
(wt   t):
To summarize, the timing is as follows:
t = 1
- The investor hires a fund company at random.
- The fund company learns 1 and chooses a hiring action e1.
- The fund manager learns s1 and chooses a trading action a1.
- Traders observe a1 and set prices.
- The investor and the fund company observe the net return yield by the portfolio.
All other traders observe v. Payments to the fund company and the fund manager are
made.
t = 2
- The investor retains the incumbent fund company or hires a new one.
- The fund company retains the incumbent fund manager or, hires the challenger
(chooses a hiring action e2).7
- The fund manager oberves s2 and chooses a trading action a2.
- Traders observe a2 and set prices.
- The investor and the fund company observe the net return yield by the portfolio.
All other traders observe v. Payments to the fund company and the fund manager are
made.
3 The Results
3.1 The Churning Equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize a churning equilibrium in which both fund companies
and fund managers always trade in the rst period. This class of equilibrium is crucial
5Since both wt and t depend on t, the compensation scheme considers the possibility of a penalty
whenever t < 0.
6We assume a zero discounting rate.
7We will see that in equilibrium this may occur only for untalented fund companies, as talented
ones always hire good managers in the rst period.
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to get both non-fully informative prices and a high trading volume.
Proposition 3.1. For , , and  low enough, there exists an equilibrium in which:
(i) The investor retains the fund company if the portfolios return is satisfactory (pos-
itive) and replaces him otherwise.
(ii) A talented fund company always both hires good managers and retains them. An
untalented fund company hires at random managers, and retains the incumbent man-
ager if and only if the portfolios return is satisfactory (positive).
(iii) A good fund manager always trades. A bad fund manager churns if t = 1, and he
does not trade if t = 2.
(iv) Traders set prices
p^at =
1
2
(1 + ^) and p^bt =
1
2
(1  ^)
where
^ =
2 + (1  )(2 + 12(1  ))
1 +  + (1  )(1 + 12(1  ))
:
Proof. See the Appendix 
Proposition 3.1 characterizes a churning equilibrium in which all managers trade in
the rst period. While the good manager trades according to his private information
on the asset value, the bad one randomizes between buying and selling.
The investor knows that a successful trade in the rst period (1 > 0) may stem
from a talented fund company (which only hires good managers) or an untalented
one. In the second case, this positive return may result from a good manager (with
probability ) or from a churning bad manager with good luck (with probability (1 
)=2). All of this suggests her that it is more likely that a successful trade comes from
a talented fund company. Consequently, she makes an upward adjustment of her belief
on a talented company when she observes 1 > 0 so that the posterior becomes higher
than the prior, i.e.,
Pr( = tj1 > 0)  :
Equivalently, the investor knows that an unsuccessful trade in the rst period (1 <
0) can only be attributed to an untalented company. In addition, we assume that
she believes that no-trade (an event out of the equilibrium path) can also only be
associated to a untalented fund company. Based upon this structure of beliefs, the
investor retains the rst-period fund company if she observes a positive return, and
replaces it otherwise.
Since a talented fund company knows perfectly the type of the manager, she only
hires good ones. As a consequence, she always observes positive returns and retains
the manager. In contrast, an untalented fund company cannot perfectly associate a
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positive return to a good manager. However, she knows that it is more likely that a
successful trade comes from a good manager than a bad one. Accordingly, she also
makes an upward adjustment on her posterior when positive returns are observed so
that
Pr( = gj1 > 0)  :
Given this structure of beliefs, an untalented fund company retains a manager only if
a successful trade is observed at the rst period.
A good manager always obtains positive returns whenever transaction costs are
low enough ( < b). Since he knows the true liquidation value of the asset, he always
trades correctly and sells or buys according to prices that lie between 0 and 1. Given
the structure of beliefs of the game, he knows that his continuation is ensured.
At rst period, a bad manager has two alternatives: no-trade or churn. On the one
hand, if he does not trade, he makes a zero return and thereby, he is revealed as a
bad manager. As a result, he is replaced for sure. On the other hand, although a bad
manager yields a negative expected return (b  1=2  ) when churning, his chance of
being retained is 50%. Given a linear compensation structure, a su¢ cient condition for
the bad manager to prefer churning is the fact that the pay-for-performance sensitivity
(the parameter ) be lower than the xed payment (the parameter ). This occurs
because in that case the benets from being retained (the second-period xed payment)
overcome the costs of churning (a rst-period penalty coming from a negative expected
return).
Traders cannot distinguish if a market order comes from a good manager or a bad
manager who churns at the rst-period. The price is then based on the probability
that the order is made by a good manager conditional on observing such an order. This
probability corresponds to
^ = Pr ( = gja 2 f0; 1g)
=
2 + (1  )(2 + 12(1  ))
1 +  + (1  )(1 + 12(1  ))
:
It can be veried that the posterior is larger than the prior, i.e., ^ > . The source of
this fact is two-fold. First, as discussed above, while good managers are always retained,
bad ones may be replaced. Second, even if a bad manager is not replaced, he does not
trade in the second period.
Interestingly, the posterior in our model is greater than the posterior resulting from
Dasgupta and Prat (2006, [1]) as
^ > 
5  
2 + 3   2 = ^D&P ;
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where ^D&P denotes the posterior in Dasgupta and Prat. This is due to the fact that
our framework nests the environment studied by these authors as we also incorporate
the possibility of talented fund companies that only hire good managers.
As a result, in our model, traders set equilibrium prices that yield a greater bid-
ask spread than that characterized by Dasgupta and Prat. To see that, note that the
bid-ask price is given by
p^at   p^bt = ^:
From this, it is clear that the bid-ask spread inherits all the properties of posterior
probability, and thus, the result follows. Thus, our bid-ask price is larger than the
Dasgupta and Prats one for all  2 [0; 1) and  > 0. Otherwise, they are equal. This
property is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows that, as long as  > 0 (i.e., there exists
talented fund companies), our model delivers a a higher bid-ask spread.8 This fact
leads us to obtain results that are stronger than those of previous literature in terms
of average trading (see Corollary 1 below).
10.750.50.250
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
gamma
bid-ask spread
Figure 1. Bid-ask spread of Portilla (2008) with  = :5 (dotted line), and Dasgupta
and Prat (2006) (solid line).
In addition, note that since the posterior probability of facing a good manager is
increasing with the proportion of talented fund companies, the bid-ask spread does so
(see Figure 2).
8Figure 1 is constructed assuming that  = :5:
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Figure 2. Bid-ask spread and proportion of talented fund companies assuming
 = :5.
3.2 Comparative Statics of Trading Volume
The main implication of Proposition 3.1 is the contribution to explaining the trade
puzzle. Trading volume correspond to the expected number of assets traded as average
in the two-period horizon. Thus, it is the average of the probability that a trade takes
place at t = 1 and the probability that a trade takes place at t = 2: From Proposition
3.1, we compute in the next corollary the trading volume in the churning equilibrium.
Corollary 3.2. The average trading volume in the churning equilibrium is
w =
2 + 3   2
4
+
(1  (1 + 1 2 ))
2
:
Proof. See the Appendix 
Some properties of the average trading volume are the following. First, it is positive
even when the proportion of good managers tends to zero. This results from the pres-
ence of a churning equilibrium, which guarantees that the equilibrium in the nancial
market is not fully informative. Second, the average trading volume is increasing with
the prior of both good managers () and talented fund companies (). This is consis-
tent with the previous results related to the bid-ask spread. Third, our model delivers
a trade volume that is higher than the Dasgupta and Prats one for all  2 [0; 1) and
 > 0, and equal otherwise. This is true as it can veried that
w = wD&P +
(1  (1 + 1 2 ))
2
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where
wD&P =
2 + 3   2
4
is the average trading in Dasgupta and Prat (2006, [1]). This fact is also illustrated by
Figure 3.
10.750.50.250
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
gamma
w
Figure 3. Average trading volume of Portilla (2008) with  = :5 (dotted line), and
Dasgupta and Prat (2006) (solid line).
Thus, our model allows to account not only for the positive, but also for the large
trading activity observed in nancial markets working under asymmetric information.
The intuition of this result is as follows. The inclusion of an extra delegation stage
in the nancial contracting process provides us with an additional source of reputa-
tional concerns. As a consequence, the two-sided career concerns setup - in particular
the presence of talented fund companies- ends up being crucial to strength previous
reputational-based explanations of the trading puzzle.
4 Conclusions
This paper examines the equilibrium of a nancial market in which there are two stages
of portfolio management delegation: one from investors to fund companies, and the
other one from fund companies to fund managers. In both agency relationships, agents
are reputational concerned. That is, they face a positive probability of being red if
their rst-period performance (measured in terms of the managed portfolio return)
is not satisfactory for the principal. These implicit incentives lead to an uninformed
manager to churn if his compensation scheme ensures him a xed salary su¢ ciently
high. Similarly, these career concern incentives lead to an uninformed fund company to
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hire a manager even knowing that it is likely that he may be uninformed, and thus, he
may generate a penalty against her. However, since the presence of churning managers
increases the chance of getting a positive return, the chance of being retained by the
investor for a fund company does so. As a result, if her compensation structure is so
that the xed component is su¢ ciently large, an uninformed fund company will decide
to (randomly) hire a manager.
This double-sided career concern setup allows a churning equilibrium to emerge in
which prices are not fully informative and the trading volume is positive and high. This
is then the main contribution of our model: it strengths previous explanations to the
trade puzzle based on reputational concerns.
Finally, it is worthy to stress that our model provides results consistent with two
stylized facts observed in nancial markets during the last decades. First, an increas-
ing participation of institutional investors has been accompanied by increasing trade
volumes (Dow and Gorton 1997, [3]). Second, an increase of delegated portfolio man-
agement has lead to a higher trading activity (Cuoko and Kanel 2001, [4], Chevalier
and Ellison 1997, [5], and 1999, [2]).
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. In order to obtain this equilibrium, we use the notion of
Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and we then apply backward induction.
Managers strategy (at t = 2). At t = 2, a bad manager never sells since p^b2 < 1=2
guarantees that p^b2 1=2   < 0: Likewise, it can be veried that a bad manager never
buys as well because p^a2 > 1=2 ensures that 1=2  p^a2    < 0.
A good manager trades as long as transaction costs are low enough. He is strictly better
o¤ buying if 1  p^a2    > 0, which is veried if  < 12(1  ^)  b, and strictly better o¤
selling if p^b2    > 0, which is also satised if the same condition for transaction costs
holds true.
Untalented fund companys belief. Possible rst-period realizations of the net return
are the following ones:
(i) Successful purchase or sale: 1 = b   > 0 provided that  < b.
(ii) Wrong purchase or sale: 1 = b  1   < 0 because b < 1.
(iii) No trade: 1 = 0.
Since only (i) and (ii) are observed in equilibrium, we can assume any conjecture for
the result out of the equilibrium path. In particular, we assume a null probability. An
untalented fund company then requires that their beliefs be consistent with equilibrium
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play which implies that
Pr( = gj1) =
8>><>>:
0 if 1 < 0
+(1 )
+ 1
2
(1+)(1 ) if 1 > 0
0 if 1 = 0
which follows from
Pr( = gj1 > 0) =
Pr( = g; 1 > 0)
Pr(1 > 0)
=
 + (1  )
 + 12(1 + )(1  )
since
Pr( = g; 1 > 0) = Pr( = g; 1 > 0j = t) Pr( = t) +
Pr( = g; 1 > 0j = u) Pr( = u)
=  + (1  )
and
Pr(1 > 0) = Pr(1 > 0j = t) Pr( = t) + Pr(1 > 0j = u) Pr( = u)
=  +
1
2
(1 + )(1  )
because
Pr(1 > 0j = t) = Pr(1 > 0j = t;  = g) Pr( = g)
+Pr(1 > 0j = t;  = b) Pr( = b)
= 
and
Pr(1 > 0j = u) = Pr(1 > 0j = u;  = g) Pr( = g)
+Pr(1 > 0j = u;  = b) Pr( = b)
=  +
1
2
(1  ):
Moreover, it is possible to show that Pr( = b; 1 > 0) = 0:
9 The untalented fund
companys best response is to retain if and only if the posterior is higher than the prior
probability, i.e. if
Pr( = gj1)  :
9Since a good (bad) manager generates a positive (negative) expected portfolio return.
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This is only satised by Pr( = gj1 > 0) since
 + (1  )
 + 12(1 + )(1  )
? 
()  + (1  ) ? 

 +
1
2
(1 + )(1  )

() (1  2)  (1  )

1
2
(   1)

which is true because the l.h.s. of the last expression is non-negative and the r.h.s. is
non-positive.
Thus, the untalented fund company retains the incumbent fund manager if it observes
a positive investment performance, and replaces him otherwise.
Talented fund company. Since the talented fund company only hires good managers,
it always observes 1 > 0 and thus, Pr( = gj1) = 1: As a result, this class of fund
company always retains the good fund manager.
Investors belief . The structure of the investors beliefs is as follows. Possible realiza-
tions of the rst-period net return imply that
Pr( = tj1) =
8>><>>:
0 if 1 < 0

+ 1
2
(1+)(1 ) if 1 > 0
0 if 1 = 0
where
Pr( = tj1 > 0) =
Pr( = t; 1 > 0)
Pr(1 > 0)
=
Pr( = t)
Pr(1 > 0)
=

 + 12(1 + )(1  )
:
Moreover, it is possible to show that Pr( = u; 1 > 0) = 0
10 The investors best
response is to retain if and only if the posterior is higher than the prior probability,
i.e. if
Pr( = tj1)  :
This is only satised by Pr( = tj1 > 0) since

 + 12(1 + )(1  )
? 
() (   1)  (1  );
which is true as the l.h.s. of this expression is non-positive and the r.h.s. is non-negative.
Thus, the investor retains the fund company if it observes a positive result, and replaces
10Since a good (bad) manager generates a positive (negative) expected portfolio return.
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it otherwise.
Fund managers strategy (at t = 1):
Good manager. If he plays a1 = s, he generates a successful return at t = 1, i.e., 1 > 0:
Thus, the good manager is retained and his portfolio again yields a positive return at
t = 2. The total good fund managers total payo¤ corresponds to
g(a = s) = (1 + ) + (2 + ): (5.1)
Notice that expected net returns generated by good managers are given by
E(tjsuccess) = b   (5.2)
Taking expectation(s) on (5.1) and using (5.2) yields
Eg(a = s) = 2 (b  ) + 2 > 0;
which holds as  < b.
Bad manager. At t = 1, he has two possibilities: trade (churn) or no trade. If he does
not trade in the rst period, he is not retained, and then, his payo¤ is
b(a = ) = :
On the other hand, if he trades at t = 1, he successes and fails with the same probability.
The expectation of the net return conditional on no successful trade is given by
E(tjfailure) = b  1   < 0:
Thus, the bad fund managers expected payo¤ corresponds to
Eb(a = f0; 1g) = 1
2
[E(t1jsuccess) + t2] + 1
2
[E(t1jfailure)]
=
1
2
[E(1jsuccess) + 2] +
1
2
[E(1jfailure) + ]
=
1
2
 f(b  ) + (b  1  )g+ 3
2

=  

^
2
+ 

+
3
2
:
Then, the bad manager churns if
Eb(a = f0; 1g) > b(a = ) = ;
which is equivalent to the condition
  =2
^
2 + 
:
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Since  < b, a su¢ cient condition is given by
  :
Traders Pricing Strategy. The probability that the second-period fund manager is good
depends on whether the fund company is talented or untalented in the rst period. In
the rst, case, this probability is one. In the second case, it depends on whether the fund
company hires a good or bad manager in the rst period. Notice that if an untalented
fund company hires a bad manager, it can hire a good manager in the second period if
the bad manager gets a unsuccsessful net return at t = 1. All of this implies that the
probability that the second-period fund manager is good corrresponds to
Pr( = g; t = 2) =  +

 + (1  )1
2


(1  )
=  + (1  )

1 +
1
2
(1  )

We have three kind of managers: second-period managers who trade only if they are
good, rst-period good managers who always trade and churners who randomize with
the same probability between buying and selling. Thus, by symmetry,
Pr ( = gja = 1) = Pr ( = gja = 0) = Pr ( = gja 2 f0; 1g)
Then, a trader who receives a buy or sell order computes the following posterior prob-
ability:
^ = Pr ( = gja 2 f0; 1g)
=
Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g)
Pr (a 2 f0; 1g)
=
Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) + Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2)
Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) + Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2)
Notice that Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) is given by
Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1j = t) Pr( = t) + Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1j = u) Pr( = u)
=  + (1  )
and Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2) corresponds to
Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2j = t) Pr( = t) + Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2j = u) Pr( = u)
=  + ( + (1  )1
2
)(1  ):
Moreover,
Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) = 1;
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and
Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2) = Pr( = g; t = 2)
=  + ( + (1  )1
2
)(1  )
Thus,
^ =
2 + (1  )(2 + 12(1  ))
1 +  + (1  )(1 + 12(1  ))
:
With this probability, the trader computes the next ask price:
p^at = Pr( = gja 2 f0; 1g)E(vj = g; a = 1) + Pr( = bja 2 f0; 1g)E(vj = b; a = 1)
= ^ + (1  ^)1
2
=
1
2
(1 + ^);
and the bid price:
p^bt = Pr( = gja 2 f0; 1g)E(vj = g; a = 0) + Pr( = bja 2 f0; 1g)E(vj = b; a = 0)
= ^0 + (1  ^)1
2
=
1
2
(1  ^):

Proof of Corollary 3.2. The average trading volume is given by
w =
Pr(a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) + Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2)
2
where
Pr(a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 1) = 1;
and
Pr ( = g; a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2) = Pr(a 2 f0; 1g ; t = 2)
= Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ;  = g; t = 2j = t) Pr( = t)
+Pr (a 2 f0; 1g ;  = g; t = 2j = u) Pr( = u)
=  + (1  )( + (1  )
2
):
Hence,
w =
2 + 3   2
4
+
(1  (1 + 1 2 ))
2
:

Two-sided Career Concern and Financial Equilibrium 17
References
[1] Dasgupta, A. and A. Prat (2006). Financial Equilibrium with Career Concerns,
Journal of Theoretical Economics 88, pp. 288-307.
[2] Chevalier, J. and G. Ellison (1999). Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), pp. 389-432.
[3] Dow, J. and G. Gorton (1997). Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management,
and Economic Welfare, Journal of Political Economy 105(5), pp. 1024-1050.
[4] Cuoco, D. and R. Kaniel (2001). Equilibrium Prices in the Presence of Delegated
Portfolio Management, Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania, 2001.
[5] Chevalier, J. and G. Ellison (1997). Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response
to Incentives, Journal of Political Economy 105(6), pp. 1167-1200.
